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Section 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The research brief for the present report has changed since the inception of  
this work due to the fact that the timetable for the Review has been extended; 
the suite of documents to be provided by the Scottish Government (SG) has 
changed and the final consultation document (hereinafter referred to as the 
Consultation Document or CD), which was not expected until after our 
deadline, has now been published (10/6/10). In essence, however, the aims  
and objectives of the present research have remained largely unchanged and 
are as follows: 
 
• To consider the best
2 
method of providing Ferry services 
(including those which can be characterised  as lifeline services) 
• To focus in particular on the question of the proposed tender 
and the bundling of routes and 
• To consider the problem of an ageing fleet, and the necessary 
programme of replacement, facing those responsible for the 
provision of ferry services in Scotland. 
 
1.2 Methodology 
 
The approach taken here is to apply well-known concepts from economic 
theory to the conceptual issues arising from the notion of public provision of 
services and tendering within the specific context of ferry services in   
Scotland.  In addition, a number of interviews have taken place (see Appendix  
1 for details) with senior management within both CalMac, Northlink  and 
David MacBrayne Ltd and also with representatives of the RMT, TSSA, Unite 
and Nautilus in order to obtain the contextual detail which is necessary for a 
proper understanding of the current provision and the likely consequences of 
any future changes. 
 
1.3 Background 
 
Following a similar review in 2005 and following investigation by the 
European Commission (EC), the Scottish Government took the view that in 
order to comply with European law on non-discrimination in the provision of 
ferry services, it was necessary to go through a tendering process. The view 
that tendering was a necessity was, and remains, disputed by a number   of 
 
 
 
2 
The concept of 'best'  refers to that which  is the most socially optimal  ie the most  economically 
efficient taking into account external  benefits such as other non-direct  employment  and income  effects. 
 
 
2 
 experts in this area3, nevertheless, it is still the view held by the current 
Scottish Government: 
 
"Tendering is a requirement imposed upon us by EU rules and will 
continue to be a requirement for  us. " 
 
(Bullet point  13, Executive  Summary, Consultation  Document, 2010.) 
 
However, one reading of the 2005 European Commission decision would be 
that it was not the failure to tender for services prior    to 2007 that made the 
system of subsidies paid to CalMac, fail the Altmark Criteria4, but the lack  of 
a clearly defined public service obligation. 
5 
That is still the case for the 
Gourock-Dunoon  route for which a separate tender process  is now being 
prepared. 
 
In preparation  for the 2007 tendering process the state-owned ferry  
companies Caledonian MacBrayne and Northlink were reorganised.  The 
current structure is described in Appendix 9 of the Consultation Document as 
follows: 
 
Accordingly, the restructuring of Caledonian MacBrayne Ltd that took 
place in 2006 involved the creation of Caledonian Maritime Assets Ltcf 
and a new group holding company, David MacBrayne Ltd, which    is 
100% owned by the Scottish Ministers and which in turn now owns 
Ca/Mac Ferries Ltd 
7 
(which won the 2007-2013 Clyde and Hebrides 
contract), NorthLink  Ferries Ltd  (which won the 2006-2012 Northern 
Isles contract), Cowal Ferries Ltd (which currently operates the Gourock-
Dunoon ferry service) and David MacBrayne Ltd HR (UK) Ltd 
(whichprovides  a range of HR services  to Ca/Mac and NorthLink). 
8
 
 
 
 
3  
Kay, Neil  (2005) and Bennett, Paul  (2005) 
4 
The beneficiary must be entrusted with a clearly defined public service mission; The parameters for 
calculating the compensation payments must be established in advance in an objective and transparent 
manner; Compensation must  not  exceed the cost incurred  in the discharge of the public service minus  
the revenues earned with providing the service (the compensation may, however, include a reasonable 
profit); The beneficiary is chosen in a public tender or compensation does not exceed the costs of a well-
run undertaking that is adequately equipped with the means to provide the public service. See also 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/235&format=HTML&aged=l &langua 
ge=EN&guiLanguage=fr 
5 
Professor Kay has also written extensively on this point. See Kay, N, Scottish Ferry Policy, Fraser of 
Allander Economic Commentary, 2009, Vol 32, No 3 available at 
http://www.strath.ac.uk/media/departments/economics/fairse/backissues/Fraser of  Allander  Economi 
c  Commentary   Vol   32,  No 3[11.pdf 
 
6  
See Caledonian  Maritime  Assets  Ltd's website  at www.cmassets.co.uk 
 
7   
See CalMac's  website  at www.calmac.co.uk 
 
8  
This  can  be  accessed  at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/935/0099973.DOC  
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In addition to the costs associated with restructuring on such a scale the actual 
tendering costs for the Clyde and Hebrides contract by CalMac was £381,000 
and the Northern Isles contract by Northlink w::i s 463,000. 9 These are not 
insignificant sums when set against the potentia l savings. 10 
 
As stated above, CalMac Ferries won the tender for 26 routes (Clyde and 
Hebrides) for the period 2007-2013 and Northlink won the tender for 2 routes 
(Northern Isles) for the period 2006-2012.  Therefore, for the past five   years 
they have together operated the vast majority of both island to island and 
mainland to island ferry services in Scotland. 
11 
The other services are run 
mainly by the local authority or community-owned operators. There are some 
private operators such as Western Ferries on the Gourock to Dunoon route and 
Pentland Ferries on the Pentland Firth route as well as some other   smaller 
independent operators, some of which operate only at certain times of the 
year. 
 
The performance of the CalMac and Northlink operations have been entirely 
satisfactory and customer satisfaction has improved substantially (eg reduced 
number  of complaints and iQdependent  evaluation  using  'mystery 
shoppers'). 
12   
Both companies have invested considerably  in training for 
quality improvement, a matter we will return to  later. 
 
There is no evidence offered by any party that these services could be   
provided at a cost lower than current levels and still provide the same levels of 
provision, quality and safety. This cannot be taken to mean that there are no 
avenues for cost savings, but such savings may have to be at the expense of 
levels of provision, quality and safety.  However, there may well be options   
for reducing costs by varying the schedules at different parts of the year or  
other variations in the specific nature of the routes, timetables and journey 
times.  At the moment, the main operators CalMac and Northlink  are  
prevented from making such changes without the specific agreement of the 
Scottish Government.  We will return to this point later in the discussion   of 
 
 
 
 
9 
The costs for CalMac can be found in the 2007-8 Annual Report, Note 7 
http://www.calmac.co.uk/ About%20Us/annualreports.html 
The costs for Northlink can be found in the 2006-7 Annual Report, Note 10 
http://www.north! inkferries.co.uk/Corporate%20informati on/annualreport2007 .html 
 
1° Findlay, .I. (2005a). 'The Financing of Lifeline Ferry Services to the Clyde and Hebrides', a report 
commissioned  by the RMT and the STUC 
11 
For full details of all the services and operators see Consultation Document, June 2010, Table 1, pp 
15-18 
12  
This information  was provided  in interviews with the outgoing Chief Executives of  David 
MacBrayne Ltd and his successor in an interview dated 9 June 2010; and with the HR Services 
Manager responsible for Northlink in an interview dated 27 June 2010. In addition, detailed 
information  was supplied by the Records Manager of David MacBrayne  Ltd on  19 August. 
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 what ferry services are needed or appropriate for each community (CDQ 14 - 
17). 
 
In Section 2 the discussion will relate to the questions specifically asked in the 
consultation exercise (hereinafter referred to as CDQ followed by the 
appropriate  number).   Sections 3 and 4 will cover a number of matters  
relevant to the research brief, which are not otherwise covered and Section 5 
will contain a summary of the key issues and some concluding   remarks. 
 
 
Section 2 Scottish Ferries  Review 
 
2.1 The Consultation Document sets out the national objectives in subsidising 
ferry services as being a contribution to the  plan: 
 
"Tofocus government and public services on creating a more 
successful country, with opportunities for all of Scotland toflourish, 
through increasing sustainable  economic growth.  " 
 
(Bullet Point 32, Executive Summary, Consultation Document,   2010.) 
 
 
The specific objectives in relation to ferry services   are: 
 
''ferry services should be safe, sustainable, efficient, responsive to 
local needs and appropriate  to the requirements of those using  them; 
 
ferry services should contribute to the sustainable population growth 
on our islands and in our remote rural communities;   and 
 
ferry services should be affordable and offer best valuefor public 
investment. 
 
(Bullet Point 37, Executive Summary, Consultation  Document,  2010.) 
 
Additional objectives are set out in terms of emissions reduction and 
objectives in terms of accessibility are assumed to be incorporated into the 
first one set out immediately  above. 
 
In order to elicit responses which would assist in arriving at a plan to meet 
these objectives the Consultation Document contains a series of questions. 
The focus here will not be on every question but on those which are most 
pertinent  to the objectives of this research  as set out above. 
 
2.2 Do you agree that change is required to improve consistency in provision 
and  secure funding  for  the  future? (CDQl) 
 
 
 
5 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The argument set out in the Consultation Document centres on the need to for  
a programme of replacement for a fleet which is, in large part, nearing the end 
of its effective life.  The amount which would be required  in the lifetime of  
the review (up to 2022) is, according to the CD, between £509m and £604m. 
This is based on the existing routes and does not take into account any   
changes or developments of ferry services which may require an expansion of 
capacity but could, at the same time, generate an expansion of revenue 
(reduction in subsidy).  We will return to this point in paragraph   2.9. 
 
Given the nature of CMAL as a public corporation, it is limited in its capacity 
to borrow to fund replacement vessels. In the context of the current plans for 
public expend iture reductions, and taking into account the inability of the 
Scottish Government under current rules, to borrow on its own behalf, CMAL 
have been considering alternative means to deal with this issue which are 
outline in the CD (Bullet points  16-18). 
 
The way that the SG has posed this question certainly narrows down the range 
of options that could be considered. However, there is no reason, in principle, 
that a wider discussion could not be had. This is a decision which has 
implications over the long term (a period of perhaps 30 to 40 years) but the 
options under examination are being set out in the context of a much shorter 
term crisis in funding and an associated lack of supply in the shipping   market 
(ie vessels withdrawn from sale because the expected price is too low 
13 
. 
 
There are a number of possible approaches to this problem in addition to the 
ones put forward in the CD. 
 
In terms of the small fleet, there is currently a project underway, funded by the 
EU and involving partners from both the north and south of  Ireland. 
 
"The Small Ferries Project is a unique study to establish how best to 
design and build afleet of small ferries to serve remote communities 
off the Scottish and Irish coastlines. " 
 
This project aims to: 
 
"examine a common design and procurement strategy for small ferries 
which could be used by each of the partners.  " 
 
This has the potential to lead to: 
 
"reduce overhead costs and increase the potential for efficiency 
savings through more joined  up working across thejurisdictions.   " 
 
 
13 
This information was provided by David Mac Millan HR Services Manager for David MacBrayne 
HR (UK) Ltd on  27/7/10 
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(http://www.smallferriespro ject.com   accessed on 1/8/10) 
 
Such strategies arc likely to lead to costs savings over the longer term and 
could be developed and extended. What is clear is that potential for savings 
along the lines indicated above are more easily real ised in the context of all 
routes remaining in a single bundle - an option only available in terms of a 
public  sector solution. 
 
The current pressures (in relation to the state of the shipping market) which  
face the main current operators would also be faced by any other company 
which acquired the tender to provide ferry services on single routes - 
assuming, for the sake of argument, that they are using their own vessels. 
However, they are unlikely to have the flexibility which a larger operation   
has:  both in terms of accessing economies of scale in procuring and in   
making contingency arrangements in the meantime by moving vessels around 
different routes. In addition, there would be concerns that, in this context, a 
private sector operator may be more inclined to cut costs by reducing 
maintenance expenditure to the very minimum required. This is a practice 
which is diametrically opposed to the practice of CMAL which maintains 
vessels to a standard higher than the minimum and thereby extends the life of 
the fleet. These matters do not arise solely as a consequence of differences in 
the rate of time discount between a private and a public sector operator 
involving, as they do, choosing short term expediency over long term cost 
reductions, or as a result of the current financial climate, but they arise also as  
a result of the very nature of a private company in which the pursuit   of profit 
as the overriding objective can be to the detriment of both quality and safety - 
a matter to which we will return later. 
 
The CD acknowledges the importance  of both  'economies of scale and scope  
in both vessel and infrastructure procurement'  but  suggests that these would   
be difficult to achieve due to the variations in the subsidy arrangements across 
all Scottish ferry services. Ifthe governments of Scotland, the Republic of 
Ireland and the Northern  Ireland Assembly can come together to procure 
vessels as outlined in the Small Ferries Project, there seems to be no reason  
why the current operators in Scotland cannot do likewise if there are savings    
to be made. Indeed CDQ27 explicitly invites responses to this idea. Clearly a 
common procurement  system or some form of collaboration  in procurement  is 
likely to bring efficiencies in scale and scope which will reduce costs well into 
the future. 
 
The imminence of a tender process, in which there is any   remaining 
possi bility of allowing private operators to use their own vessels, makes a full 
and transparent discussion of the state of the fleet, and the exact timetable for 
replacement,  almost impossible from the point of view of CMAL  which 
would have to safeguard commercial confidentiality.   In that scenario  (ie 
 
 
 
7 
  
 
• 
 
 
 
 
 
where CMAL ships are not used), the cost of the vessels for a private operator 
would form part of the charge to the SG in terms of the size of the subsidy.    In 
that event, the public purse would be paying for vessels which it would never 
own. 
14
 
 
As it stands, however, the CD makes clear that they are not considering 
allowing private operators to use their own ships for the vast majority of the 
routes, so the question of investment in the fleet and the tendering process are 
quite separate. So, if the tender requires the operator to lease vessels from 
CMAL then the problem remains as to how the programme of replacement is  
to be funded.  It may be that at the point where any of the current vessels go  
out of service, leasing for a period (if vessels are available) may be necessary 
unti l such times as the current financial restrictions begin to ease.  This does 
raise the question as to whether leased ships come with crews which raises 
additional, significant problems. 
15
 
 
Another approach could be to seek to fund, at least partially, the programme  
of vessel replacement, by expanding high demand services (initially by using 
existing vessels more intensively) and thereby expand revenue. This is linked 
to the fares policy and is discussed further in Section  2.8. 
 
 
2.3 Do you think that harbou rs should be self-funded through harbou r dues 
or do you thin k the current system of funding improvements through 
grants should continue?   (CDQ2) 
 
On the question of whether ports and harbours should be self-funding, the 
difficulties raised in the CD about losing control of expenditure on 
infrastructure and facilities are well made and acknowledged  here. 
The difficulty arises in terms of a mov.e to a system where instead of making 
grants which can be managed, the costs are likely to form part of the  operating 
subsidy which is less amenable to direct control. In addition, the independent 
review 
16 
commissioned by CMAL and released as part of the Ferries Review 
concludes that there is 'no specific evidence that ports are not   operated 
efficiently'  but makes a number of recommendations to improve  regulation. 
 
If,however, there were to be any unbundling of routes, a system of full-cost 
pricing for use of harbour facilities would, at least, ensure that there would be 
no hidden subsidy to private sector operators on potentially profitable  routes. 
 
 
 
 
14  
This is a point acknowledged  by the SG itself as outlined  in CD Chapter 2, bullet point   29. 
15 
See Findlay, J, evidence to the Local Government and Transport Committee of the Scottish 
Parliament, 31 May 2005b available at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/committees/lg/or-  
05/l g05-l 902.htm 
16  
Review of Scottish Ports Hosting Lifeline Ferry  Services, June 2010, Fisher Associates  available   at 
http://www.scotland.gov  .uk/Resource/Doc/935/0100133 .pdf 
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2.4 How much of the funding should come from the users of   the service? 
(CDQ3) 
 
A response to this question is tied up in responses to questions about 
development of services and the setting of  fares. 
 
2.5 Do you agree that we should test the market by tendering some routes on 
a single basis with the option for the operator to bring their own vessels? 
(CDQ4) 
 
The narrative in this section of the CD itself sets out some of the difficulties 
which would arise as a consequence of unbundling of routes, particularly  in  
the event that private operators would be allowed to supply their own vessels. 
These relate to what would happen to any vessels not required by tendering 
organisations. If CMAL were to dispose of them then they would not be 
available next time round, leaving the SG with no alternative but to pay 
whatever charge was made by private operators.  Disposing of them   now 
would also mean that there is a danger of disruption to services given the 
specialised nature of these ships 7• Other potential problems with this 
proposal  have also been partially addressed  above. 
 
One point which should be made is that such operators do not necessarily 
have to own a vessel (indeed they are unlikely to own a vessel which    is 
suitable for the waters in which it will be required to  sail 
18
 but may 
themselves lease a vessel in order to tender for the route. In those 
circumstances, there seems to be no reason why a private sector operator  
would be able to lease on more favourable terms than CMAL, should such a 
need arise. Whether a private operator leases or owns a vessel the SG will be 
required to pay for it anyway in terms of the subsidy, a point that the CD 
acknowledges. 
 
There is another, potentially more serious issue which relates to the concept of 
the Operator of Last Resort.  Professor Neil  Kay has written extensively   over 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
One aspect of the specialised nature of these vessels (in addition to the others mentioned elsewhere 
in this report) is that, at time of build, they are constructed so that they have 'derogation' from the 
normal restrictions from carrying dangerous goods. For example, they can carry both hay and fuel at 
the same time -this has obvious benefits in terms of economies of scale -and clearly meets the 
normal needs of the islanders. 
18 
In an interview with Phil Preston of CalMac conducted on 17/8/10, he indicated that the 31 vessels 
currently  used by  CalMac are 'largely interchangeable'  with  obvious benefits  in terms of  flexibility 
and  avoidance of service breaks.  More importantly,  in this context, they are all seagoing vessels  and  
are built to sail in waves up to Sm; the nearest equivalent fleet is in the Baltic and they are restricted to 
2.5m waves.  So the question of who can lease a vessel  more cheaply is largely  irrelevant since very   
few such vessels are available. Furthermore, according to Mr Preston,  'small  ferries do not exist 
anywhere  else'. 
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a long period on this very matter and it is, to date, still unresolved 1
9
• The need 
for an Operator of Last Resort exists whether or not there is a public or private 
operator of a serv ice but it is undoubtedly more crucial in the latter case, both 
in the tendering process (where unsuitable operators would be likely to apply  
in the knowledge that the absence of an OLR will give it the upper hand in 
future negotiations with the SG) and in the carrying out of the contract itself 
(where the issue of moral hazard arises both with regard to the maintenance  of 
the vessels
20  
and, more crucially, in terms of the completion of the contract  on 
the original terms). Specifically, the incumbent would have an incentive to 
simply seek to renegotiate the contract in its favour, in the knowledge that the 
SG would have no alternative but to comply. There is an even greater risk of 
this if a failure to win the contract were to lead, as it most probably would, to 
the demise of CalMac. 
 
In the status quo case, while there would still be a need for an OLR, CalMac 
and North link operate in the context of a completely different set of structural 
relations to the SG and face a different set of incentives to that of a private 
company. This, in and of itself, would make the chance of these outcomes 
being realised far less likely. 
 
While the sections above are not necessarily  linked to the unbundling of  
routes (ie there is still a need for an OLR even if all routes are tendered as one 
bundle), it is far more likely that a private sector operator would both bid   for, 
and win, a tender for a single route than for the whole bundle and therefore the 
probability of these potential problems becoming actual problems  increases. 
 
Finally, but very importantly, there are external benefits which currently arise 
as a result of the operations of CalMac and North link which would not arise 
(or not to the same extent) in the context of a private operator. These together 
with a discussion of safety issues are contained in Sections 3 and  4. 
 
2.6 Do you agree that Ardrossan-Brodick, Wemyss Bay -Rothesay, Ohan - 
Craignure, Largs - Cumbrae and the Pentland Firth are the correct 
routes to consider tendering as a single route? (CDQS) 
 
and 
 
Should the remaining  routes stay within  2 bu ndles? (CDQ7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
Kay, N, 2010, The Ferries and the Last Resort: how the Government is putting the public interest at risk, 
available at http://www.brocher.com/Ferries/LastResort.htm  
 
20  
See Findlay,  J, 2005a and 2005b op  cit 
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 SG have offered no reason as to why the specific routes mentioned should be 
tendered  separately other than on the basis of passenger  numbers.   Indeed, 
there are arguments against doing so based on the specialised nature of the 
vessels currently used  on at least two of these routes which  are necessary  
given the shallow-draft berthing. There is no suggestion that there are specific 
problems with the current provision  on these routes and the only assumption   
to be made is that these are routes which are potentially profitable and   
therefore attractive to the private sector. Given all the other problems outlined 
so far with regard to changes in the status qua, the risk associated with such 
changes appear to outweigh any potential benefits. It is not clear why such 
cherry-picking should be facilitated by the SG and the European Commission 
decision of 200521 (summarised  in Appendix  9 of the CD) specifically allows 
for bundling as it allows for 'maximum flexibility of the fleet to best serve the 
network'  and the CD also acknowledges this in the   statement: 
 
'bundling of all routes enhances integration of the network by 
making it easier to combine safety, quality and environmental 
aspects of vessel and port operations and to ensure that 
standards  are applied evenly across the  network' 
 
(CD, Appendix 9) 
 
In effect then the suggestion that these routes, with large numbers of   
passengers annually, should be tendered separately means that higher numbers 
of people may be offered a ferry service which  could become  less reliable,  
less safe and of lower quality. 
 
Finally, bullet point 42 of Chapter 2 of the CD contains 'arguments against 
retention of these bundles'.  On examination  it would appear that the first   
point in the list 'the high cost of the services in their current form' is not 
obviously related to bundling; the second and third points, which relate to   
larger bundles being more difficult to bid for, are effectively the same point  
and the fourth point appears to have been put in the wrong place as it is 
effectively an argument for retention of the bundle. So, the only argument 
remaining  for splitting the bundle appears to be that it would  facilitate the 
entry of private operators. Finally, none of these routes involve the  
communities which the HIE Economic  Work Package Report
22  
identify as   the 
 
'specific communities where investment inferry  services is most likely,  
in relative terms, toproduce  the greatest  contribution  to GES.. ' 
 
 
 
 
 
21   
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/coal/state    aid/doc/decisions/2008/2008    0016   uk c.pdf. 
22 
Scottish Ferries Review: Economic Work Package prepared by Reference Economic Consultants for 
Highlands  and Islands Enterprise & Scottish Government,  February  2010   can  be accessed  at 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/935/0099986.pdf  
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This reinforces the view that the only motivation for selecting these routes for  
a single tender is to facilitate the entry of private operators, rather than to 
improve the quality and safety of ferry services or to enhance the Government 
Econom ic Strategy. Discussions mentioned immediatel y below about 
loosening and lengthening the contract are also subject to the same   criticism. 
 
2.7 Should we consider the implications of a looser tender, where a minim u m 
level of service is required but where the operator has flexibility to 
innovate and reduce costs where they see fit?  (CDQS) 
 
The CD asks respondents to consider this question in the context where a 
'minimum level of service' could be specified. Given that a) that minimum is 
unlikely to be acceptable to the various island communities unless it is set at  
the existing level of service and b) that a private operator, on winning the 
tender, would have an incentive to provide only the minimum level of service 
(particularly given the fact that there are no profitable routes at present), then   
it is not clear that this would constitute an improvement on previous tender 
specification arrangements. Any associated lengthening of the contract, not 
specifically mentioned here, but mentioned  elsewhere by those carrying out  
the Ferries Review, carries with it some potential dangers.  The only  
conceptual reason for tendering services is that the pressure of competition is 
believed to drive down costs for the same service; lengthening the period of   
the contract, in fact, relieves this pressure.  The difficulties in choosing   the 
correct contract length in order to achieve the presumed benefits while 
encouraging entry by private operators is well known in economics
23 
and, in 
practice,  is extremely difficult to get it right.  This introduces a further  degree 
of risk in separating out the bundle compared to the option of retaining the 
bundle. 
 
2.8 What should be the rationale for, and purpose of, the fares policy? 
(CDQll) 
 
This question can really only be considered in the context of what services are 
to be provided. As mentioned above, the replacement of the fleet and the 
problems surrounding that question could be resolved  in terms of reviewing  
the provision of services and identifying whether or not there is potential for 
expanding services where there is demand and thereby increasing   revenue. 
For example, it may be that there are routes where it would be possible to 
increase capacity (either by acquiring new ships or running current ships more 
frequently), and expand revenue (either by reducing fares if demand is less 
elastic (ie less responsive) or increasing fares if demand is still inelastic or by 
leaving fares constant) and use the increased revenue to fund any   replacement 
 
 
 
• 
23  
See for instance  Salanie, Bernard,  (1997), The Economics  of Contracts: A Primer,  MIT 
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 vessel and/or to reduce subsidy. The key issue here is that these issues should 
not be artificially  separated. 
 
2.9 What kind of ferry service should be funded?  (CDQ14 -·17) 
 
The conceptual issue here is the distinction between what fe1 ry services are 
'needed ' and what ferry services would be 'demanded'. This may determine 
what should be funded and what should be delivered at fares which reflect 
market rates.  While the conceptual difference  is clear, applying this 
distinction  in practice would undoubtedly be difficult.  One way of  
considering it would be to say that, for the purposes of such a discussion, that 
the current service levels are based on 'need'  and that further expansions  
should be undertaken only on a commercial basis (NB: this is not the same as 
saying they should only be supplied by a private operator).  There appears to   
be no reason why both CalMac and North-Link could not be allowed to  
develop the services they provide based  on a route-by-route   analysis. 
Certainly there appears to be no principled reason why they should be 
arbitrarily prevented from providing services which they feel would be both 
popular and commercially viable. In an interview with a senior manager in 
Northlink, it was made clear that there are a number of areas where 
improvements  in service could be made which would meet those   criteria. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 3 Employment impacts of ferry services 
3.1 This aspect of the original remit became, in a sense, redundant as a result of  
the published  report commissioned  by Highlands  and Island Enterprise
24
 
which carried out an analysis of the employment effects of ferry services on  
the communities served by them.  Given the timescale of the current research   
it is unlikely that better estimates of these effects could be   produced. 
However, a couple of aspects of the report  should be   highlighted: 
 
• The estimates are based on data for all ferry operators (with estimates 
being used for Western Ferries and Pentland Ferries) therefore 
differences in the pay rates and the employment  levels are hidden  
within industry averages. However, it is known that both pay rates and 
crewing/employment  levels are higher  in the public sector  companies 
 
 
 
24 
Direct Employment and Income Impacts of Ferry Services, Reference Economic Consultants, May 
2010  can  be  accessed  at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/935/0099984.pdf  
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and therefore those companies have a greater impact on the 
communities which they serve25 . 
• Employment in the ferry sector clearly provides a higher level of 
income to employees than the average income for all the areas in  
which they are located - see Table 2.5 of the HIE report. This i s taken 
to also reflect the higher n umber of full-time, permanent posts than in 
the labour market generally in  Scotland. 
• The income impacts are only the direct impacts (ie the wages and 
salaries received). There will also be second-round impacts: ie when 
ferry crews spend on local goods and services this supports 
employment outside the ferry industry. These second round  impacts  
are likely to be large because most of the spending activities of ferry 
employees (particularly in the island communities) will be carried out 
in their own communities and won't 'leak' out to other areas thereby 
diminishing the local employment effect. In these circumstances, the 
direct impacts of ferry sector employment are likely to be a significant 
underestimate of the total  impact of ferry sector employment. 
 
 
 
Section 4 Quality and  Safety 
 
4.1 These issues, only touched on in the CD, are vital to any review of ferry 
services and any tendering process. They are being dealt with separately here 
because there is no specific question which relates to them in the CD   itself. 
 
4.2 Quality 
 
In the run-up to the 2007 tender there were a number of discussions around   
the quality of service being provided by CalMac and there were indications 
from the ferry transport users committee of a number of areas of  
dissatisfaction. A 2008 investigation by the Transport, Infrastructure and 
Climate Change Committee of the Scottish Parliament indicated that the main 
area of dissatisfaction with CalMac related to timetabling.  This is a matter  
over which CalMac does not have complete control for a number of reasons, 
not least of which is that the SG has to approve changes in timetabling and 
have, on occasion, refused to do  so. 
 
The Committee is aware that many island residents have 
already raised with Ca/Mac Ferries the question of timetable 
improvements on specific routes. In many cases the response  from 
 
 
25 
This author has had sight of a report carried out for Orkney Islands Council into pay, benefits and 
terms and conditions offerry crews, which, while written to protect confidentiality, suggests that,  
given the operators who responded and their relative weight in terms of numbers of employees, that 
pay and conditions within CalMac and Northlink are superior to other operators. Figures from the 
RMT confirm this  suggestion. 
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CalMac Ferries has been that the company would like toput on 
improved services but that major barriers exist which prevented this 
from happening, such as hours of working regulations or a shortage of 
vessels. 
 
(TICC Committee, SG, 4
1   
Report 
26
 
 
 
The same committee also heard evidence that while there were some areas of 
dissatisfaction to do with arrangements for connecting services (again not the 
sole responsibility  of CalMac), there was also a large degree of  appreciation 
of the professionalism and courtesy of the staff. They also heard evidence that 
the customer care, quality improvement and customer feedback mechanisms 
used by Northlink were of a high quality and that CalMac, although, by their 
own admission, still lagging behind  in terms of changing attitudes, were   
taking steps to improve these aspects of their   performance. 
 
27
Ca!Mac now has 3 Shipping Service Advisory Committees which are 
designed to act as a means for channeling customer views. In addition, the 
practice is now for Regional Managers to meet with Community Councils to 
pick up on concerns re timetabling and other issues. There is evidence that 
CalMac has invested in quality via a number of routes including a 
comprehensive system of customer service training which has resulted in a 
huge reduction in the number of complaints received. The newly appointed 
Chief Executive, Archie Roberson has spoken of 'empowering' ferry users. 
Information provided for this report by the Records Manager of David 
MacBrayne Ltd show that over the past three years (since the current contract 
was put in place in October 2007) the number of complaints has been on 
average 0.022% of passengers  travelling.   In addition, he added that: 
 
It should be noted that many of the concerns expressed by customers 
relate to single issues, for example, the decision to  deploy  the  NorthLink 
vessel to transport travellers  stuck  in Scandinavia  due  to the volcanic 
ash, and the breakdown of the Ca/Mac  vessel  mv Clansman. 
 
The equivalent rate of complaints for Northlink is 0.04% since the contract 
began in July 2006. Details of the Customer Complaints procedures used by 
both CalMac and Northlink  are contained  in Appendix 4. 
 
In terms of the quality standards required under the contract with SG, 
Northlink  has in the last year only incurred one penalty for failing to  provide 
 
 
 
 
26   
Available  at  http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/s3/committees/ticc/reports-08/trr08-04.htm  
27 
The information contained in this paragraph and para 4.3 was provided by the outgoing and current 
Chief Executive  on 9 June 2010 
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 services.
28   
They provide a host of basic courses for all staff including   
Personal  Safety and Social Responsibility,  Elementary First Aid, and 
Diversity Training. They are currently introducing a new SG initiative in 
Customer Care (well ahead of most operaters) for all of their staff, beginning 
with those in the Hotel Department. They use a mystery shopper (operated by 
an independent  company) every month; they have customer feedback forms  
on boards on each ship and they also publicise the way that they have 
responded to such feedback. 
 
 
4.3 Safety 
 
This is perhaps the most important aspect of any ferry operator's performance 
and the safety of the service is one of the main objectives set out by the SG in 
the CD (quoted here in Section 2.1). The safety record of both CalMac and 
Northlink are very good indeed29 and this is in no small part   due to the 
training provided  by the public sector operators; to the quality and  
maintenance of the vessels, and to the levels of crewing which are also above 
the minimum  required by the relevant regulation.  Details of the manning  
levels of CalMac vessels are contained in Appendix 3. In order to put this into 
context the following explanation was provided by an experienced crew 
member: 
 
The minimum manning is the minimum that you can sail the ship with. 
Ifyou look at the isle of Lewis (JOL) the safe manning is 15, however 
when you are carrying passengers for example passenger certificate 
PC2 860 passengers you need a minimum of 24 crew, so the additional  
9 would generally  be catering department. Any staff over and above 
the 24 would be extra toprovide the service, if the company reduced 
the catering service they could go down to the minimum 24 crew or  if 
they put in a lower passenger certificate (PC3) 312 Pass then they 
could reduce the crew minimum accordingly i.e. 18, this has never 
been done... 
 
 
As explained below, the catering crew are also trained in a number of 
passenger safety procedures and any reduction in overall crewing levels, even 
in terms of catering staff, would impact on the ability of the crew to deal with 
emergencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28  
A bar was closed due to a member of staff becoming  sick very   suddenly 
29 
There were two incidents involving CalMac ships recently (June 09 and Feb 10) arising in one case 
from component failure, but noone was hurt in either   incident. 
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 CalMac 
 
Ca!Mac trai n mariners at all levels and are large enough to be able to broker 
arrangements with other companies in order to be able to get sufficient sea- 
time for trainees. Traini ng is focused on safety, career progression and the 
needs of an ongoing business, despite the fact that they, like any other 
successful bidder, only hold the contract for 6 years at a time. They operate a 
policy of moving crew around the various routes in order to 'reduce 
complacency' which has been found to be the cause of an accident in 2004 
when a ship hit a pier at Oban.  A single route operator would, of course, not  
be in a position to do this. In addition, and again, as a result of the 2004 
accident, they are promoting the idea of a bridge team to 'get away from 
autocratic  masters'. 
 
North link 
 
Northlink is clearly extremely pro-active  in training and development  and has 
a very high safety culture
30
• Details of the training requirements for each 
member of the crew for each vessel  show that the least trained  member of  the 
crew (in terms of numbers of qualifications), usually the cook, has between 8 
and 10 separate qualifications including Personal Survival Techniques, Fire 
Prevention and Fighting, Crowd Management, Safety Training and Crisis 
Management. Therefore, even those crew members whose job  is largely 
involved  with  customer  care are capable,  in emergencies,  of ensuring the 
safety of passengers,  other crew members and themselves.  Northlink  also has  
a record  of introducing  any new regulations/safety  procedures  immediately 
and well in advance of any compulsory measures.  Private operators, on the  
other hand, have an incentive to leave all new (and costly) measures until they 
are forced to introduce them by law. For example, the Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watch Keeping amendments of 1995 were phased in over 5 
years.   The public  sector operators introduced them  immediately  while many 
in the private sector waited till the last minute and then asked for extensions. 
They are looking now at complying fully with the Maritime Labour    
Convention 2012 which, among other things, 'sets minimum requirements for 
seafarers to work on a ship'. They use an Occupational Health  Company to  
offer 'lifestyle medicals' to staff and operate a zero tolerance policy  in relation  
to drugs and alcohol. Northlink has also invested in training facilities so that 
important safety training can take place closer to where their crews are based, 
this has resulted  in significant costs savings.  They are able to do this because  
of the numbers of employees that they are training.  Again this is an area,    
where even if an operator on a single route was minded to provide the highest 
quality training, in the shortest possible time, they would not be able to benefit 
from the economies of scale outlined above and therefore the cost would be 
greater  for the public purse. 
 
 
30 
See Appendix 2 for details of the Northlink training requirements for each member of the crew on 
each vessel. 
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In short, the focused approach, within the public sector, on high quality 
training, not only provides economic benefits and offers opportunities for  
good quality employment, higher wages and career progression for members 
of the relevant communities; it also is integral to the safety consciousness and 
excellent safety record of the publ ic sector operators. Any tender process 
should ensure that bidders are considered on a like-for-like basis, and  any 
failure to properly account for the features discussed above, may lead to 
overall losses, not just to the economy of some of the most fragile parts of the 
Scottish economy but also to the record of safe and reliable transport which  
the island communities currently enjoy. 
 
 
Section 5 Conclusion 
 
• The decision to tender ferry services in 2005 and to do so again in the near 
future is not regarded by all independent experts as being entirely necessary to 
comply with EU law, however, given the views of the Scottish Government, 
such a tender is likely to go ahead 
• The costs associated with tendering are high 
• The potential benefits from tendering in terms of costs savings are unlikely to 
be high 
• The d ifficulties of ensuring investment in an ageing fleet are great but a 
solution is unlikely to be found via the tendering process 
o Private operators are unlikely to have suitable vessels  
o There are few suitable vessels available to be chartered 
o Private operators are in no better position to charter than the public 
sector operators 
o The safety issue, which is acknowledged to be paramount, could be 
compromised by the use of alternative vessels and the removal of 
responsibility for maintenance by CMAL 
• Longer term solutions such as central procurement and development of 
commercially viable services (ie at market-based fares) to offset public 
subsidy could be investigated 
• There is no evidence that the public sector ferry operators are not operating 
efficiently within the constraints placed on them by the Scottish  Government 
• Their qual ity standards are high and rising 
• The safety record of the public sector companies are extremely high and 
incentives and opportunities for them to remain so are greater than that faced 
by the private sector operators 
• The quality and safety standards are more easily maintained in the context of a 
large operator holding the contract for all the Clyde and Hebrides and   
Northern Isles routes 
• There appears to be no argument for the suggested single tender routes other 
than to facilitate private operators 
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• Single route operators are unlikely to be able to offer the same degree of  
quality and safety training to employees at the same cost as they are unable to 
access economies of scale in this  regard 
• The im pact of ferry operators is high and vital to the communities which th ey 
serve: 
o In terms of the direct and indirect income and employment effects  
o In terms of the impact on the island economies and their scope   for 
development 
• The public sector operators, relative to the private ferry operators offer good 
quality employment, higher wages and career progression for members of the 
relevant communities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 Appendix 1 
Interview Schedule 
4 June 2010  Ian Mcintyre, RMT 
Tom Kennedy, TSSA 
 
9 June 2010 Laurie Sinclair, outgoing Chief Executive, David MacBrayne 
Ltd 
Archie Robertson, incoming Chief Executive, David 
MacBrayne Ltd (including follow-up email  correspondence) 
 
27 June 2010  David MacMillan, HR Services Manager  (Northlink Crewing) 
David MacBrayne HR(UK) Ltd (including follow-up email 
correspondence) 
 
Telephone Interviews 
 
7 July 2010 Paul Moloney, Assistant General Secretary,  Nautilus 
International 
 
17 August 2010 Philip Preston, Managing Director, CalMac Ferries  Ltd 
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Appendix 2 
 
Northlin k Qualifications Chccklist - to be supplied in hard copy 
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Appendix 3 
 
MCA Merchant Shipping Notice 1767 M Hou rs  of  Work,  Safe Manning  and 
Wc1 tch Keeping,  1Septcn1ber 2002 - to be supplied  in  hard copy 
 
Manning Levels for CalMac Vessels - to be supplied in hard copy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 Appendix 4 
 
Customer Complaints Procedures 
 
Ca lMac 
 
All customer comments and correspondence received by CalMac Ferries are recorded  in 
the Respond database. Formal concerns are acknowledged  within  5 working  days of 
receipt and replied to within 21 working days of the date of acknowledgement. If it  is 
not possible to reply to the concern within the 21 days, a holding letter will be sent 
advising of the reason  for the delay and a likely timescale for a  reply. 
 
CalMac Ferries distributes Customer Feedback  Forms and  customers are encouraged to 
complete one of these. Website Customer Feedback Forms are also available and both 
are recorded in Respond, and depending on the nature of the comments a reply may be 
sent. Of those who have completed a Customer Feedback Form, on average around 90% 
would recommend  the Company to others. 
 
Northlink 
 
All customer concerns are acknowledged on receipt and a substantive response is 
provided  within 2 weeks  ofreceipt of the concern. 
 
All passengers are encouraged to complete and submit a Customer Satisfaction 
Questionnaire and the comments are reviewed by at least one senior manager. All the 
Questionnaires are scanned and the results collated so positive  and  negative  trends can 
be identified. 
 
NorthLink also engage specialists every few years, to undertake a statistically significant 
sampling of Orkney & Shetland residents and visitors to  establish  their views on the 
services provided and any specific aspects. One of the aims of this is to establish the 
factors the islanders use to decide whether to travel and if so, whether to travel with 
NorthLink. The results are compared to the previous study to identify how the Company 
are fairing relative to competitor service  providers. 
 
Both Companies utilise a 'Mystery Shopper' company to report regularly on the customer 
experience and the results are analysed.  Any  adverse  reports  are  investigated and acted 
on, where possi ble. 
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